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The ability to engage in goal-directed behavior despite exposure to stress is critical to
resilience. Questions of how stress can impair or improve behavioral functioning are impor-
tant in diverse settings, from athletic competitions to academic testing. Previous research
suggests that controllability is a key factor in the impact of stress on behavior: learning how
tocontrolstressorsbufferspeoplefromthenegativeeffectsofstressonsubsequentcogni-
tivelydemandingtasks.Inaddition,researchsuggeststhattheimpactofstressoncognitive
functioning depends on an individual’s response to stressors: moderate responses to
stress can lead to improved performance while extreme (high or low) responses can lead
to impaired performance. The present studies tested the hypothesis that (1) learning to
behaviorally control stressors leads to improved performance on a test of general execu-
tive functioning, the color-word Stroop, and that (2) this improvement emerges speciﬁcally
forpeoplewhoreportmoderate(subjective)responsestostress.Experiment1:Stroopper-
formance, measured before and after a stress manipulation, was compared across groups
of undergraduate participants (n=109). People who learned to control a noise stressor
and received accurate performance feedback demonstrated reduced Stroop interference
compared with people exposed to uncontrollable noise stress and feedback indicating an
exaggeratedrateoffailure.Inthegroupwholearnedbehavioralcontrol,thosewhoreported
moderate levels of stress showed the greatest reduction in Stroop interference. In con-
trast, in the group exposed to uncontrollable events, self-reported stress failed to predict
performance. Experiment 2: In a second sample (n=90), we speciﬁcally investigated the
role of controllability by keeping the rate of failure feedback constant across groups. In
the group who learned behavioral control, those who reported moderate levels of stress
showed the greatest Stroop improvement. Once again, this pattern was not demonstrated
in the group exposed to uncontrollable events.These results suggest that stress control-
lability and subjective response interact to affect high-level cognitive abilities. Speciﬁcally,
exposure to moderate, controllable stress beneﬁts performance, but exposure to uncon-
trollable stress or having a more extreme response to stress tends to harm performance.
These ﬁndings may provide insights on how to leverage the beneﬁcial effects of stress in
a range of settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Stress is part of life. Pursuing goals despite exposure to stres-
sors, or better yet, showing enhanced functioning in response
to stress, are abilities that are fundamental to survival and
resilience (Maier and Watkins, 2010). For a broad range of daily
goals, it is critical to know what type of stress can help or
harm behavioral functioning. Musical concerts, athletic com-
petitions, and academic testing are all settings in which stress
may either impair performance or fuel pursuit of goals. To per-
form optimally, healthy humans must expose themselves to the
types of stress that promote the most enhanced functioning
possible.
The effects of stress on cognitive functions, speciﬁcally, may
mediate the helpful and harmful effects of stress in complex
domains such as those described above. Stress research with
humanshasyieldedevidenceforbothpositiveandnegativeeffects
of stressandstresshormonesoncognitivefunctions(Lupienetal.,
1999).Thisresearchhasrevealedthatworkingmemory,afunction
thoughttobeveryimportantforexecutivefunction(EF),ispartic-
ularly sensitive to such effects (Lupien et al.,2007). Several studies
showthatstressexposure(Dunckoetal.,2009;Weerdaetal.,2010)
or naturalistic stress (Lewis et al.,2008) can lead to improved per-
formance on tests of working memory. However, other studies
havedemonstratedthatthesametypesofstressexposurecancause
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impairedperformanceonworkingmemorytasks(Oeietal.,2006;
Schoofs et al., 2008, 2009; Luethi et al., 2009), as do higher levels
of naturalistic stress (Sliwinski et al., 2006). Finally, a third set of
research results show no differences in performance on working
memory tasks between conditions of stress or no-stress exposure
(Kuhlmannetal.,2005;Porcellietal.,2008;Qinetal.,2009).What
might explain these mixed ﬁndings?
One possibility is that these research endeavors have often
focused on group differences (e.g., stress group versus no-stress
group) without examining individual differences in response to
those stressors (either subjective stress response or physiologi-
cal reactivity). When researchers have monitored physiological
reactivity to stress, several studies have found that cortisol and
performance on working memory tasks are negatively correlated
(Qin et al., 2009; Schoofs et al., 2009) especially when adrenergic
activity is also high (Elzinga and Roelofs, 2005). Animal research
has demonstrated that the effects of stress intensity on behavior
are characterized by an inverted-U-shaped function: while low or
high levels of stress lead to performance impairment on tests of
vigilance and working memory,a moderate level of stress leads to
performance improvement (Lupien et al., 2007; Arnsten, 2009).
Neurobiological studies suggest that these quadratic effects are
related to levels of stress hormones (e.g., glucocorticoids) and
adrenergic activity (e.g., catecholamines) in the brain, especially
in prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions (Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic,
1998; Mizoguchi et al., 2004; Lupien et al., 2007; Hains and Arn-
sten,2008;Arnsten,2009),whicharecriticallyinvolvedinworking
memory and EF processes. Examining individual responses to
stress, and how these responses relate to subsequent cognitive
functioning (in either linear or quadratic relationships), is thus
criticalforclarifyingthequestionof whenstressmayhelporharm
behavioral performance.
Controllability of stressors is also a key factor that inﬂu-
ences how stress affects behavioral performance (Dickerson and
Kemeny, 2004; Arnsten, 2009). Controllability is a characteristic
of stress that has been explored in“learned helplessness”research.
This research typically uses a triadic design in which two groups
are exposed to equivalent stress but differ on whether or not it is
possible to learn to control stressors, and a third (control) group
is not required to learn control and usually is not exposed to
stress. After these manipulations,participants are tested on learn-
ing or problem-solving tasks, and comparison of performance
between groups reveals the effects of stress exposure and con-
trollability. Learned helplessness research has provided evidence
fortheharmfuleffectsof exposuretouncontrollablestress,aswell
as the protective effects of having behavioral control over stres-
sors. Speciﬁcally, while exposure to uncontrollable stress leads
to passivity, negative affect, and disrupted performance on sub-
sequent cognitively demanding tasks, being able to learn how
to behaviorally control the same stressor buffers the individual
from these negative effects (see Maier and Seligman, 1976, for
review). An extensive literature documents learned helplessness
effects in a range of animal species (see Seligman, 1972; Maier,
1984 for reviews) and the neural mechanisms inhibiting the stress
response under conditions of controllability are well deﬁned in
rodents (Maier and Watkins, 2005). Research with humans has
replicated the behavioral effects of controllability, showing that
uncontrollable situations, in which behavioral responses cannot
affectoutcomes,leadtopoorerperformanceonsubsequentlearn-
ing and anagram tasks (Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto and Seligman, 1975;
Jones et al., 1977; DeVellis et al., 1978; Hirt and Genshaft, 1981;
Kofta and Sedek, 1989) and possibly a higher cortisol response
(Peters et al.,1998).
Thus, controllability of, and individual responses to, stressors
inﬂuence the effects of stress exposure on cognitive and behav-
ioral functioning. However, several intriguing questions about
the nature of these effects remain unexplored. First, the ques-
tion of what types of stress exposure can enhance cognitive
functioning remains only partially resolved. While some promis-
ing evidence suggests that exposure to moderately intense stress
predicts improved working memory performance, the dearth of
research on individual differences, and inconsistencies in group-
level effects, make this association far from conclusive. Further-
more,thequestionremainsopenwhetherexposuretocontrollable
stress can enhance behavioral functioning. A number of stud-
ies documented the impairing effects of uncontrollable stress,
but failed to ﬁnd any beneﬁt of exposure to controllable stress
(Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto and Seligman, 1975; Jones et al., 1977; De-
Vellis et al., 1978; Hirt and Genshaft, 1981). However, several
other studies demonstrated that people exposed to controllable
stress show improved learning and cognitive ability in compari-
son to people exposed to either uncontrollable stress or no-stress
(Thornton and Jacobs, 1971; Thornton and Powell, 1974; Benson
and Kennelly, 1976; Eisenberger et al., 1976, 1979). We have yet
to determine whether, and how, controllable stress exposure may
enhance cognitive and behavioral functioning.
Second, although controllability of stress and individual dif-
ferences in stress response have been investigated separately, lit-
tle research has examined the interaction of these factors. One
researchstudyshowedthatparticipantswhoappraisedstressorsas
challengingperformedbetteronanactivecopingtaskthanpartic-
ipants who appraised the same stressors as threatening (Tomaka
et al., 1993), suggesting that subjective reactions predict perfor-
mance differences in a context of controllable stress. However,
because the passive coping task used in this study for comparison
had no measure of performance, it is not possible to determine
whether subjective reaction would predict a different pattern in
the context of uncontrollable stress. Another study identiﬁed an
interaction between dosage of stress and individual differences in
locus of control in predicting performance on an anagram task
(Pittman and Pittman, 1979), although individual responses to
stressors were not assessed. In sum,existing research supports the
robust inﬂuences of controllability and stress reactivity in mod-
erating the effect of stress on cognitively demanding tasks, but
investigation of interactions between these factors remains sparse.
Third, our understanding of the cognitive abilities affected by
stress controllability and level of stress response remains impre-
cise. Although both human and animal research suggests that the
effects of controllability on cognitive function are mediated by
underlying systems fundamental to learning (Maier and Watkins,
2005), the exact nature of those systems in humans is unclear.
The most consistently replicated consequences of uncontrollable
stress are impaired performance on novel, goal-directed learning
tasks or complex tasks such as anagrams (reviews by Oakes,1982;
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Tennen, 1982). Deﬁcits on these complex tasks may have a num-
ber of sources ranging from slowed processing speed to reduced
abilitytodirectandsustainattention.Hence,untilresearchiscon-
ductedusingtasksthatisolateparticularcognitiveabilities,itisnot
possible to determine which abilities are affected by controllabil-
ity and which are not. Several pieces of evidence suggest that EF
may be the most likely underlying cognitive function impaired
by exposure to uncontrollable stress. EF refers to a set of abilities
including holding abstract goals in mind, using goals to provide
“top-down”directionforattentionalallocation,andinhibitingthe
processing of sensory information, thoughts or actions that are
irrelevant to or incompatible with current goals. EFs are often
recruited for tasks requiring complex cognition, including the
various learning and problem-solving tasks that have been tra-
ditionally administered in stress controllability research. Of note,
EF abilities are supported by systems in PFC, which is particu-
larlysensitivetotheeffectsof stresshormonesandcatecholamines
(Arnsten, 2009).
Most of the research investigating effects of stress intensity or
reactivity has focused on working memory ability. However, it is
not known whether stress speciﬁcally affects working memory,
or EF more broadly. EFs are best characterized as separable but
related cognitive processes, with both unique and shared indi-
vidual differences, genetic inﬂuences, and neural substrates (e.g.,
Miyake et al., 2000; Collette et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2008).
Impairment on working memory tasks could arise either from
impairment of processes speciﬁc to working memory, or from
impairment of processes common across multiple aspects of EF,
namely the ability to actively maintain goal information (common
EF;Friedmanetal.,2008).Initialresearchsupportsthetheorythat
stress affects executive abilities more broadly;researchers detected
a larger difference between stressed and control subjects in per-
forming a Sternberg working memory task when subjects had to
ignore emotional distractors presented during a delay (Oei et al.,
2009).Inotherresearch,scientistsfoundthatTrierstressexposure
predicted impaired performance on tests of cognitive“ﬂexibility”
suchasremoteassociatesoranagramstasks(Alexanderetal.,2007)
and that inducement or blockade of physiological arousal served
torespectivelyimpairorimproveperformanceonsuchtasks(Bev-
ersdorfetal.,1999).Thus,stressappearstohaveeffectsacrosstasks
that vary in the aspects of EF they tap, suggesting that stress may
affect working memory abilities, at least in part, because stress
affects processes that are common across EF tasks. This previous
research suggests that common EF processes may be key cognitive
functions affected by stress exposure.
To explore common EF processes in the current research, we
administeredthe“goldstandard”of EFtasks(MacLeod,1992),the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In this task, participants must iden-
tify the color of ink in which a word is printed while ignoring the
meaning of the word, which may contain competing color infor-
mation (e.g.,BLUE written in red ink). Hence,one must maintain
the goal of identifying ink color in the face of highly distracting
information (as in the competing color information conveyed by
word meaning). Latent variable analysis has demonstrated that
the Stroop task loads strongly on a common EF factor (Friedman
et al.,2008),suggesting that this measure is suitable for examining
general executive ability.
In sum, the current research investigated the helpful or harm-
ful effects of stress on common EF, as assessed by the Stroop
task. Speciﬁcally, this research explored the (linear or quadratic)
relationship between individual differences in stress response
and Stroop performance, and whether these effects depend on
controllability of stress exposure.
EXPERIMENT 1
STUDY GOALS
This study tested the hypothesis that controllability of stress, and
individual differences in subjective stress, are factors that inter-
act to affect EF. Our stress manipulation included two sources
of psychological stress to which participants were exposed while
performing a choice-RT task: social-evaluative stress in the form
of performance pressure, and sensory stress in the form of noise
exposure.
Previous research has shown that uncontrollable, social-
evaluative stress is the most potent form of psychological stress
(Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). Researchers have deﬁned uncon-
trollability as non-contingency between instrumental actions and
outcomes (Oakes and Curtis, 1982), as repeated failure feedback
regardless of responses (Klein et al., 1976; Jones et al., 1977;
Kilpatrick-Tabak and Roth, 1978; Hirt and Genshaft, 1981)o ra s
bothnon-contingencyandfailure(Hiroto,1974;HirotoandSelig-
man,1975;Benson and Kennelly,1976;Klein and Seligman,1976;
Miller and Seligman, 1976; Price et al., 1978; Kofta and Sedek,
1989). We structured the manipulation of uncontrollability to
include both non-contingency and increased rates of failure. This
decision was based on research indicating that this conjunction of
stressors generates the most robust perception of uncontrollabil-
ity, while the conjunction of true contingency and a high rate of
success is the strongest generator of perceived control (Gernigon
et al., 2000). This body of research also suggests that explicitly
manipulatingperformancefeedbackmakestheabsenceof contin-
gency more obvious,and overrides the normal bias to assume one
is controlling events when desired outcomes (here, shorter noises
asopposedtolongernoises)arefrequent(Vallee-Tourangeauetal.,
2005).
Social-evaluative stress occurs when an important aspect of
self-identityis(orcouldpotentiallybe)negativelyjudgedbyother
people. Social-evaluative stress has been operationalized experi-
mentally as pressure to succeed in active performance situations,
e.g., on tasks that require overt or cognitive responses (Dicker-
son and Kemeny, 2004). We designed our stress manipulation to
include social-evaluative stress by including trial-by-trial perfor-
mance feedback, and by testing each participant individually in
the presence of an experimenter.
As a result of the above considerations, we manipulated stress
exposure between groups in the following manner. In our con-
trollable stress condition (CSt), participants received accurate,
feedback regarding their performance (fast responses elicited suc-
cess feedback), and could learn to control the duration of noise
stressors by responding quickly to stimuli. In our uncontrollable
stress condition (USt), participants were exposed to two sources
of uncontrollability. First, the type of noise and nature of per-
formance feedback received for each trial were not contingent
on responses. This non-contingency made it impossible for these
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participants to learn how to control the duration of the noise
stress or reliably predict success versus failure feedback. Second,
people in this group received a higher proportion of (inaccurate)
failure feedback. This biased performance feedback suggested to
participants that their responses were, overall, not fast enough to
successfullyperformthetask.Importantly,theCStandUStgroups
did not differ on noise exposure,task stimuli,or response require-
ments. Finally, we included a third, no-stress condition (NSt), in
which people were required to respond to identical stimuli as the
other two groups, but received no performance feedback or noise
exposure.
In this study, participants completed the Stroop task at the
beginning of the research session to assess their baseline ability to
exert general EF.After completing one of the three stress task con-
ditions described above, participants completed the Stroop task a
second time. This design allowed us to control for baseline dif-
ferences in EF by examining changes in Stroop performance from
pre- to post-stress exposure.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were 109 undergraduate volunteers ages 18–24 from
introductory psychology courses at the University of Colorado
Boulder (Table 1). Participants provided informed consent and
were treated in accordance with procedures approved by the
University of Colorado Boulder Institutional Review Board.
Participants were tested individually in private rooms.
PROCEDURE
Participants were informed of the study procedures at the begin-
ning of the research session, provided written consent, and were
randomly assigned to one of the three stress conditions (USt,
n =41;CSt,n =42;NSt,n =26)1.Thesequenceof anexperimen-
tal sessions was: (1) PANAS-X pre-testing, (2) Stroop, (3) stress
manipulation, (4) Stroop, (5) PANAS-X post-testing, (6) assess-
ments of subjective stress response, perceived control, and Beck
Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Table 2). At the conclusion of
the research session,all participants were given written debrieﬁng
1Original recruitment included a sample size of 127 participants; however, 3 par-
ticipants in the CSt condition and 1 participant in the USt condition failed to
complete the experiment due to computer error, and 14 participants in the NSt
condition failed to complete self-report measures due to experimenter error. For
these reasons, analyses were performed on a sample size of n =109.
information. Participants exposed to uncontrollable stress were
debriefed verbally about such uncontrollability.
Materials
A computer system captured accuracy and reaction time (RT)
via millisecond-accurate keyboard press for all trials. Participants
assigned to stress conditions that included an auditory stressor
(either 2000 or 4000ms in duration) listened to stimuli through
headphones, with volume calibrated at 72–80dB.
Test of executive functioning: color-word Stroop. On each trial
of the Stroop task a word written in one of four ink colors (green,
yellow, red, or blue) appeared in the center of the screen for
2000ms and participants identiﬁed the ink color as quickly as
possible by hitting the corresponding button on the keyboard.
Prior to beginning the ﬁrst Stroop task, participants were given
16 practice trials in which XXXX stimuli were presented to famil-
iarize the participant with the task demands and location of the
response keys for each of the four colors. During the task, trials
werepresentedintwoblocks(48trialseach;38%incongruentand
62% neutral across blocks). Incongruent words feature conﬂict
between ink color and word meaning (e.g., RED written in blue
ink), while neutral (non-color) words do not (e.g., SUM written
in blue ink). Comparing RT to incongruent versus neutral words
isolatestheindividual’sabilitytoexertcognitivecontrolintheface
of highlydistractinginformation,overandabovebasicperceptual
processing abilities and response speed. Therefore,the calculation
of percent difference in incongruent versus neutral RT [(incon-
gruent RT−neutral RT)/neutral RT] yields an interference score
that indexes general executive functioning. This method of cal-
culating Stroop interference (as a percentage of neutral trial RT)
controlsforscalingeffectsinRTmeasures,inwhichRTdifferences
tend to scale with the magnitude of RT latency (Lansbergen et al.,
2007).
Stress manipulation. Participants performed a choice-RT task
and either were (USt and CSt groups) or were not (NSt group)
exposed to concurrent psychological stress. The choice-RT task
required participants to choose behavioral responses based on
perceptual features in the display (Figure 1).
For each trial, an arrow pointing either left or right appeared
inside a white ﬁxation box on the computer monitor. Participants
responded to the direction of the arrow as quickly as possi-
ble by pressing the corresponding button on the keyboard. All
Table 1 | Demographics and descriptive statistics for Experiment 1.
Condition Sample
n (n female)
Self-report Cognitive tasks
Subjective
stress
M (SD)
Subjective
control
M (SD)
BDI score
M (SD)
Pre-stress Stroop
interference
M (SD)
Post-stress Stroop
interference
M (SD)
Change in
interference
M (SD)
CSt 42 (29) 17 .07 (4.67) 6.71 (1.47) 11.51 (6.54) 0.0119 (0.0101) 0.0074 (0.0094) −0.0045 (0.0108)
USt 41 (24) 19.02 (4.43) 4.32 (1.84) 9.73 (6.86) 0.0107 (0.0103) 0.0096 (0.0090) −0.0011 (0.0106)
NSt 26 (10) 14.56 (5.28) n/a 8.65 (8.20) 0.0132 (0.0110) 0.0106 (0.0091) −0.0026 (0.0101)
Total 109 (63) 17 .16 (5.00) 5.53 (2.04) 10.15 (7 .11) 0.0118 (0.0103) 0.0090 (0.0092) −0.0027 (0.0106)
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participants completed a practice block (20 trials) without any
stress exposure,to familiarize themselves with the choice-RT task.
Inthetwotestingblocks(80trialseach),participantsintheCSt
and USt groups had two performance goals: (1) to respond accu-
rately and fast enough to beat a challenging time limit, for which
theyreceivedperformancefeedbackindicatingsuccess(yellowﬁx-
ation box) or failure (blue ﬁxation box;blocks 1 and 2);and (2) to
Table 2 | Experimental procedure (Experiments 1 and 2).
Task or measure Time (minute)
EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE
Rating of state affect (PANAS-X) 2
Assess baseline general executive functioning
(color-word Stroop)
5
Stress manipulation 16
Assess post-stress general executive functioning
(color-word Stroop)
5
Rating of state affect (PANAS-X) 2
Rating of subjective stress, control 2
Report depression (BDI-II) 5
Total 37
learn how their responses controlled the duration of a noise stres-
sorthatwasevokedbyeachresponse(block2only).Participantsin
the NSt condition completed the same task, but with no feedback
or noise stress. This task was based on classic manipulations of
instrumentalcontrolinwhichparticipantsmustlearnhowtocon-
trolanoisebypushingasequenceofbuttons(Hiroto,1974;Hiroto
and Seligman,1975).
For the CSt group,feedback and noise exposures were control-
lable: fast, accurate responses elicited short noises accompanied
by success feedback, while slow or inaccurate responses elicited
long noises coupled with failure feedback. A moving-window for
response speed ensured that every participant was able to beat
the time limits on 80% of trials, and participants received success
feedbackandshortnoisesonthesetrials.Whenparticipantsfailed
tobeatthetimelimit(20%of trials)theyreceivedfailurefeedback
and long noises.
For the USt group, feedback and noise exposures were uncon-
trollable,both(1)becausefeedbackandnoiseswerenotcontingent
on response speed, and (2) because feedback was biased to indi-
cate a higher rate of failure (blue ﬁxation box for 50% of trials,
regardlessof responsespeedoraccuracy).TheCStandUStgroups
were matched on their true response success and noise exposure:
asintheCStgroup,amoving-windowforresponsespeedensured
that every participant was actually able to beat the time limits
FIGURE 1 | Stress manipulation: In both Experiments 1 and 2, all groups
completed a simple choice-RT task that either was accompanied by
psychological stress in the form of performance feedback and noise
exposure (controllable stress: CSt group and uncontrollable stress: USt
group) or was not accompanied by these forms of stress (no-stress: NSt
group).The manipulation consisted of a practice block that was identical
across groups, followed by two testing blocks that varied between groups.
Performance feedback (blocks 1 and 2): the NSt group received no
performance feedback; the CSt group received accurate feedback indicating
success or failure in responding fast enough to beat a time limit; the USt
group received performance feedback that was unrelated to their response
speed and either featured an exaggerated proportion of failure feedback
(Experiment 1) or was equated on feedback with the CSt group (Experiment
2). Noise exposure (block 2): the NSt group received no noise exposure; the
CSt group was able to learn that short noises were contingent on responding
fast enough to beat time limits; the USt group was exposed to non-contingent
noises unrelated to response speed or performance feedback, and the
amount of short and long noises were equated with the CSt group.
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on 80% of trials, and every participant received a short noise on
80% of trials. However,unlike the CSt group,the USt participants
received non-contingent performance feedback that was biased
for failure (success feedback for only 50% of trials) and short and
long noises were random and unrelated to their response speed or
performance feedback2.
Finally, for the NSt group, participants received no perfor-
mancefeedback(greenﬁxationboxaftereveryresponse,regardless
of response accuracy or speed) and were not exposed to noise
(Figure 1).
Assessment of subjective stress response. At the end of testing,
participantsreportedsubjectiveratingsof stresstoprovideamea-
sure of individual differences in response to the stress exposure.
Participants rated the following on a 1 (low) to 9 (high) scale: (1)
levelof stressfulnessof thenoiseexposures(CStandUStonly),(2)
level of stressfulness of the task (choice-RT) demands, (3) degree
to which you believe someone else would have performed better
than you (social comparison), (4) degree to which you believe
you performed well on the task. The scores for these scales were
summed to yield a composite score of subjective stress for each
participant. Because they did not rate the noise exposure item,
scores for participants in the NSt condition were multiplied by
4/3 to make this group comparable to the CSt and USt groups.
Across the sample, scores were mean-deviated for the purpose of
regression analyses.
Assessmentofperceivedcontrol. Self-reportedperceptionofcon-
trol was also assessed at the end of testing, with ratings reported
from 1 (low) to 9 (high). This measure was collected to conﬁrm
that our manipulation of controllability was successful in eliciting
differences between groups.
Assessment of mood and affect. We used well-validated mea-
sures of current depression and state affect to conﬁrm that groups
wereequivalentonthesedimensionsatbaseline,andtoinvestigate
whetherparticipantsexperiencedchangesinaffectoverthecourse
of testing.
Participants reported level of depression in the past two weeks
using the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). Previous research has shown
that current depression can moderate the effects of controllable
stress on cognitive task performance (Klein et al., 1976; Miller
and Seligman, 1976; Price et al., 1978). In addition, sex dif-
ferences in physiological and psychological responses to stress
are consistently noted in stress research (e.g., Ordaz and Luna,
2012). Therefore, for all analyses, we also conducted regres-
sions including BDI-II score and participant sex as covariates.
Unless otherwise indicated, the signiﬁcance of the results was not
2We expected that response speed on choice-RT trials would vary between groups,
given that the no-stress group did not receive performance feedback and there-
fore may have been less motivated to respond quickly on choice-RT trials. Analyses
revealed an effect of stress exposure, in which the NSt group had slower response
times in both testing blocks than the CSt or USt group (p’s <0.001), who did not
differ from one another (p’s >0.2). However, response speed on choice-RT trials
was unrelated to subjective stress (p’s >0.1) or Stroop interference (p’s >0.5), and
including choice-RT speed as a covariate in the Stroop analyses failed to alter any
statistical effects. Therefore we report simple analyses only.
altered by the addition of these covariates and we report simple
analyses only.
In addition, they completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Questionnaire (PANAS-X; Watson and Clark, 1999) both before
and after cognitive testing as a measure of state affect.
RESULTS
Data processing and analyses
For the Stroop tasks, RT analyses were conducted by calculating
an average for each trial type. Incorrect trials and trials on which
RTswerelessthan200msorexceeded3standarddeviationsabove
the within-subject mean were excluded from analyses. RTs were
natural log transformed to reduce the skew common to RT data
and which violates the statistical assumption of normal distribu-
tion necessary for analysis. Accuracy analyses were conducted by
calculating the total correct for each trial type pre- and post-stress
manipulation.
Data were analyzed with multiple-regression analyses. For
group comparisons, two orthogonal contrast-coded predictors
were entered in the regression model: controllability (CSt=1,
USt=−1, NSt=0) and stress exposure (CSt=−1, USt=−1,
NSt=2). For group by subjective stress response (linear or
quadratic) interactions, these contrast codes were multiplied
by the subjective stress score (controllability×subjective stress
and stress exposure×subjective stress) or square [control-
lability×(subjective stress)2 and stress exposure×(subjective
stress)2].
Outlier detection was accomplished in two ways: (1) observa-
tions on self-report measures that exceeded 3 standard deviations
above or below the group mean were excluded from analyses; (2)
for any signiﬁcant regression effects,standardized df beta was cal-
culated to detect observations that had undue inﬂuence on the
analysis according to the standard threshold (df beta>2/(
√
n)).
Effects of controllability on perceived control and subjective stress
As a manipulation check, we compared self-reported perceived
control between the CSt and USt groups (note: members of the
NSt group did not rate this item, as they were not asked to learn
to control outcomes). Conﬁrming that the controllability manip-
ulation was effective, the CSt group (M =6.71) reported a higher
level of perceived control during the stress manipulation than the
USt group (M =4.32), t(1,81)=6.57,p<0.001, R2 =0.35.
We conducted analyses to examine whether our stress manipu-
lationaffectedsubjectiveratingsofstress.Includingsexasacovari-
ate revealed a signiﬁcant difference in subjective stress responses
between men and women, across groups; women reported
higherstress(M =19.44)thanmen(M =13.43),F(1,98)=35.09,
p <0.001, R2 =0.26. Controlling for sex, there was a signiﬁcant
effectof stressexposureonsubjectiveratingsof stress.Participants
who were not exposed to noise or performance pressure stress
(i.e., the NSt group) reported lower subjective stress (M =14.56)
than participants exposed to stress (M =18.05), F(1,98)=4.79,
p=0.031, R2 =0.05. However, there was a no effect of con-
trollability on subjective stress, F(1,98)=1.62, p=0.21, and no
interactions between sex and stress exposure or stress controlla-
bility (p’s >0.34). These analyses suggest that female participants
experienced our research task as being more stressful than male
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participants, but that the nature of the relationships between
controllabilityandsubjectivestressweresimilarbetweenthesexes.
Finally, because subjects in the uncontrollable stress group
received a higher rate of failure feedback, we might expect their
performance ratings to be more negative than the ratings of sub-
jects in the other groups. This is reﬂected in their slightly higher
composite ratings of subjective stress (see Table 1), although
as noted above, when controlling for sex differences in stress
response, the difference in subjective stress between controllabil-
ity groups was not signiﬁcant. Furthermore, because our analyses
were conducted via multiple-regression, in which the effect of
each predictor variable is detected over and above variance shared
between predictors, such relationships between stress condition
and subjective response variables are controlled. However,we also
conducted analyses using a revised subjective stress composite
that only included ratings of noise and task stress. The pattern of
results was consistent with that reported above:there was a signif-
icant difference between men and women’s reports of subjective
stress (p <0.001), and a signiﬁcant effect of stress exposure on
subjectivestress(p =0.01)butnoeffectsofcontrollabilityorinter-
actions with sex (p’s >0.37). Moreover, analyses of stress effects
on executive functioning using the revised subjective stress com-
positemeasureyieldedthesamepatternofresultsasthosewiththe
full 4-scale composite measure. Because these patterns remained
consistent, and due to the higher reliability of a composite stress
measure that includes four, as compared with two, rating scales,
all subsequent analyses used the full 4-scale composite measure.
Effects of stress controllability and subjective stress on executive
functioning
We conducted a regression predicting changes in Stroop interfer-
ence by the following: group contrast codes (controllability and
stressexposure),thelineareffectof subjectivestress,thequadratic
effect of subjective stress, and interactions between group predic-
torsandstressresponseeffects(Table 3).Alleffectsarecontrolling
for all other variables in the regression model.
There was a signiﬁcant difference in Stroop interference
changes between the controllable and uncontrollable stress
groups, F(1,98)=7.76, p=0.006, R2 =0.07. This result indi-
cates that when participants are equated on subjective stress,
exposure to controllable stress is related to greater improve-
ments in Stroop performance than exposure to uncontrollable
stress. In addition, there was a signiﬁcant quadratic relation-
ship between subjective stress and changes in Stroop interference,
F(1,98)=5.33,p=0.023,R2 =0.05. While low and high levels of
subjective stress were related to increased interference, a moder-
ate level of subjective stress was related to reduced interference
(improved Stroop performance).
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between stress control-
lability and the quadratic effects of subjective stress in pre-
dicting change in Stroop interference, F(1,98)=5.37, p=0.023,
R2 =0.05. This result indicates that the quadratic relation-
ship between subjective stress and Stroop performance varies
between the controllable and uncontrollable stress conditions.
Follow-up analyses were conducted to determine the nature
of this difference. Speciﬁcally, there was a signiﬁcant quadratic
relationship within the CSt group, F(1,38)=7.72, p=0.008,
R2 =0.17, showing that while low or high levels of subjective
stress were related to impaired Stroop performance, moderate
levels of subjective stress were related to improved Stroop perfor-
mance. In contrast, there was no quadratic relationships between
subjective stress and interference change within the USt group,
F(1,38)=0.064,p=0.8,orwithintheNStgroup,F(1,23)=0.088,
p=0.7 (Figure 2).
We conducted analyses to conﬁrm that baseline differences in
Stroopperformancedidnotdrivetheeffectsofgroupnotedabove.
A regression predicting baseline interference scores by group con-
trast codes conﬁrmed that there were no signiﬁcant differences in
Stroop performance between subjects randomly assigned to each
of the three stress conditions, F(2,106)=0.48,p=0.6.
We conducted analyses to investigate whether experimental
groups differed in Stroop accuracy, either at baseline or over the
Table 3 | Regression table for Experiment 1, model predicting change in Stroop interference (post-pre stress manipulation) by group status
(controllability: compares CSt versus USt groups; stress exposure: compares NSt group versus the average across CSt and USt groups);
subjective stress response (subjective stress: the linear effect of subjective stress; subjective stress2: the quadratic effect of subjective stress);
and interactions between these factors.
Source SS df MS Fp R 2
Model 0.002 8 0.000 1.817 0.083 0.129
(Constant) 0.001 1 0.001 12.222 0.001 0.111
Controllability 0.001 1 0.001 7 .762 0.006 0.073
Stress exposure 0.000 1 0.000 0.209 0.648 0.002
Subjective stress 0.000 1 0.000 1.664 0.200 0.017
Subjective stress2 0.001 1 0.001 5.327 0.023 0.052
Controllability×subjective stress 0.000 1 0.000 0.015 0.903 0.000
Stress exposure×subjective stress 0.000 1 0.000 0.808 0.371 0.008
Controllability×subjective stress2 0.001 1 0.001 5.373 0.023 0.052
Stress exposure×subjective stress2 0.000 1 0.000 1.863 0.175 0.019
Error 0.012 98 0.000
Total 0.014 106 0.000
aR
2 =0.129 (adjusted R
2 =0.058).
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 1: Change in Stroop interference predicted by
subjective stress and controllability. Change in Stroop interference
(post-pre stress manipulation) predicted by individual differences in subjective
stress and by group. (A) Quadratic relationship between subjective stress and
change in Stroop interference across all groups. (B) Quadratic relationship
between subjective stress and change in Stroop interference within the group
of participants with behavioral control over stressors. (C) Absence of a
signiﬁcant relationship between subjective stress and Stroop interference
changes for the group of people exposed to uncontrollable stress, or (D) to
no-stress.
course of testing. There were no differences in baseline incon-
gruent or neutral trial accuracy between groups (p’s >0.15).
Next we examined changes in incongruent trial accuracy from
before to after the stress manipulation. There was no effect of
stress exposure on changes in incongruent trial accuracy: sub-
jects in the no-stress group showed no changes on this measure
(M =−0.19), and their performance did not differ from that of
subjects exposed to stress (M =−0.32), F(1,106)=0.24, p=0.8.
However,there was a signiﬁcant difference detected between con-
trollability groups: subjects who were exposed to controllable
stress showed more of an improvement in accuracy on incon-
gruent trials (M =0.26) than subjects exposed to uncontrollable
stress, who showed a slight decrease in accuracy (M =−0.88),
F(1,106)=4.71, p=0.03, R2 =0.04. There were no changes in
neutraltrialaccuracyoverthecourseof testing,andnodifferences
in such accuracy change between groups (p’s >0.7).
We conducted a full regression in which changes in incon-
gruent trial accuracy were predicted by group contrast codes, the
linear and quadratic effects of subjective stress, and interactions
between these variables. This analysis revealed a marginal dif-
ference in accuracy change between the CSt and USt groups in
which having behavioral control predicted a greater improvement
in incongruent trial accuracy,F(1,99)=2.80,p=0.09,R2 =0.03.
Mood and affect
All groups showed similar positive affect (M =28.63),
F(2,106)=0.004, p=0.9, and negative affect (M =14.68),
F(2,106)=1.57, p=0.2, at baseline. We also conducted analyses
to investigate whether changes in affect (post-testing affect – pre-
testing affect) over the course of testing were signiﬁcantly differ-
ent between groups. On average, participants reported minimal
changesinnegative(M =−0.66)andpositiveaffect(M =−5.88),
and there were no differences between groups, F(2,106)=1.16,
p=0.3 and F(2,106)=1.37, p=0.3. In addition, all groups
showed comparable, and low, current levels of depression as
assessed by the BDI-II,(M =10.15), F(2,105)=1.41,p=0.2.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that controllability of stress,
as well as individual differences in subjective response to stress,
together inﬂuence the impact of stress exposure on executive
functioning in the color-word Stroop. Speciﬁcally, these results
show that characteristics of stress exposure such as controllability
and subjective response can cause stress to have either beneﬁcial
or harmful effects on cognitive abilities. Exposure to control-
lable stress improved executive functioning only when that stress
was experienced as moderate. In contrast, stress response had
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no relationship with executive functioning when stress exposure
was uncontrollable. Furthermore, when equating participants on
levels of subjective stress, those who learned to control stressors
showedimprovedStroopperformancecomparedtothoseexposed
to uncontrollable stress.
Althoughtheseresultssuggesttheimportanceofcontrollability
in moderating the effects of stress on EF, it is not clear from this
study which aspects of controllability are essential to this relation-
ship. The question of specifying which aspects of controllability
actively drive effects has been controversial. Some studies have
suggested that differing rates of failure account completely for
learnedhelplessnesseffects(Matute,1994,1995),whileothershave
demonstrated that non-contingency is the crucial factor, and fail-
ure is unnecessary, in evoking learned helplessness (Oakes and
Curtis,1982; Tennen et al.,1982b; Kofta and Sedek,1989).A third
body of research suggests that these factors have additive or inter-
a c t i v ee f f e c t so nb e h a v i o r( Koller and Kaplan, 1978; Tennen et al.,
1982a). In considering the results of Experiment 1,one possibility
is that the ability to learn contingencies between actions and out-
comes caused moderately reactive participants to respond adap-
tively to controllable stress,while the inability to learn contingen-
cies eradicated this relationship for people exposed to uncontrol-
lable stress. Another possibility is that differences in performance
feedback contributed to the moderating effect of controllability:
people exposed to uncontrollable stress received biased feedback
indicating a higher rate of failure,which may have caused them to
feel discouraged or lose motivation (although all groups reported
similar affect before and after testing). With the goal of clarifying
which aspects of uncontrollability generated the effects observed
in Experiment 1, we conducted Experiment 2, in which rates of
failurefeedbackwereheldconstantacrossgroupsexposedtostress.
EXPERIMENT 2
STUDY GOALS
To test the hypothesis that non-contingency between behavioral
actionsandstressorsiscriticaltotheeffectsweobservedinExper-
iment 1, we equated our controllable and uncontrollable stress
groups on performance feedback, so that participants in both
groups would receive the same total amount of success and fail-
ure feedback over the course of testing. However, it was once
again impossible for participants in the uncontrollable condition
to learn how to control stressors or accurately anticipate the type
of feedback they received for each trial.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 90 undergraduate volunteers ages 18–24 from
introductory psychology courses at the University of Colorado
Boulder (Table 4). Participants provided informed consent and
were treated in accordance with procedures approved by the Uni-
versity of Colorado Boulder Institutional Review Board. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to one of three stress conditions
(USt, n=28; CSt, n=30; NSt, n=32)3.
Procedure
Study procedures were the same as in Experiment 1.
Materials
Individual testing and materials were the same as in Experiment
1,except as noted.
Stress manipulation. The stress manipulation was modiﬁed for
Experiment 2 to hold the rates of success and failure feedback
constant across CSt and USt groups. Every research participant
responded to identical choice-RT trials, and a moving-window
forresponsespeedensuredthateveryonewasabletobeatthetime
limitson70%oftrials.Again,theNStgroupneverreceivedperfor-
mancefeedback(greenﬁxationboxaftereveryresponse).TheCSt
participants received accurate, response-contingent performance
feedback (success feedback for 70% of trials), and received short
noises on successful trials (70%) and long noises on failed trials
(30%). The USt participants received an identical rate of success
feedback (70%) that was, however, not contingent on response
speed, and were exposed to short (70%) and long (30%) noises
that were unrelated to their response speed or to performance
feedback. Noise exposures were once again equated between the
CSt and USt groups, so participants in these groups received the
same total number of short and long noises.
Participants in the CSt and USt groups completed a practice
block (20 trials) without noise exposure or feedback, a feedback
block (60 trials) that included performance feedback as described
above but no noise exposure, and a stress block (60 trials) that
included performance feedback and noise exposure as described
3Recruitment included an additional two participants in the USt group, however,
these participants failed to complete the experiment due to (1) computer error,
and (2) one participant reported color-blindness that caused him to be unable to
perform the Stroop task.
Table 4 | Demographics and descriptive statistics for Experiment 2.
Condition Sample
n (n female)
Self-report Cognitive tasks
Subjective
stress
Subjective
control
M (SD)
BDI score
M (SD)
Pre-stress Stroop
interference
M (SD)
Post-stress Stroop
interference
M (SD)
Change in
interference
M (SD)
CSt 30 (18) 17 .13 (4.32) 5.57 (1.33) 9.20 (6.78) 0.0159 (0.0091) 0.0105 (0.0090) −0.0054 (0.0101)
USt 28 (14) 15.26 (5.38) 2.61 (2.64) 9.46 (5.79) 0.0118 (0.0127) 0.0073 (0.0101) −0.0045 (0.0155)
NSt 32 (16) 12.99 (4.03) n/a 11.16 (5.89) 0.0165 (0.0137) 0.0100 (0.0104) −0.0065 (0.0151)
Total 90 (48) 17 .16 (5.00) 4.14 (2.54) 9.97 (6.17) 0.0149 (0.0120) 0.0094 (0.0098) −0.0055 (0.0135)
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above.ThesetrialblockswereshorterinExperiment2tominimize
the amount of noise exposure per participant, and equate the
amount of long noises (reported in pilot testing as considerably
more stressful) experienced by each participant across Experi-
ments 1 and 2. Participants in the NSt group completed the same
taskbutdidnotreceivefeedbackornoisestressduringanyblock4.
Othermeasures. Allassessmentsof executivefunctioning,mood,
affect, and subjective stress response, were conducted in Experi-
ment 2 with the same measures as implemented in Experiment 1.
Again, we also conducted regressions including BDI-II score and
participant sex as covariates. Unless otherwise indicated, the sig-
niﬁcance of the results was not altered by the addition of these
covariates and we report simple analyses only.
RESULTS
Data processing and analyses
Data processing and analyses were the same as for Experiment 1.
Effects of controllability on perceived control and subjective stress
Conﬁrming that the controllability manipulation was effective,
the CSt group (M =5.57) reported a higher level of perceived
control during the stress task than the USt group (M =2.61),
t(1,56)=5.44,p<0.001, R2 =0.35.
Next we investigated the effects of stress exposure and con-
trollability on subjective stress responses. Again, including sex as
a covariate revealed a signiﬁcant difference in subjective stress
responses between men and women, across groups; women
4AsinExperiment1,theNStgrouphadslowerresponsetimesinbothtestingblocks
thantheCStorUStgroup(p’s <0.001),asexpected.Inthesecondtestingblock,the
CSt group had faster response times than the USt group (p=0.03) but this differ-
encedidnotemergeintheﬁrsttestingblock(p=0.8).Responsespeedonchoice-RT
trials was unrelated to subjective stress (p’s >0.1) or Stroop interference (p’s >0.3),
and including choice-RT speed as a covariate in the Stroop analyses failed to alter
any statistical effects. Therefore we report simple analyses only.
reported higher stress (M =17.20) than men (M =13.46),
F(1,79)=12.04, p =0.001, R2 =0.13. Controlling for sex, par-
ticipants who were not exposed to noise or performance pressure
stressreportedlowerlevelsof stress(M =12.99)thanparticipants
who were exposed to stress (CSt,M =17.13 and USt,M =15.26),
F(1,85)=4.44,p=0.038,R2 =0.05. However,there was no effect
of controllabilityonsubjectivestress,andnointeractionsbetween
sex and stress exposure or controllability (p’s >0.14).
Effects of stress controllability and subjective stress on executive
functioning
To examine the interactive effects of stress controllability and
subjective stress on executive functioning, we conducted regres-
sionanalysisinwhichchangeinStroopinterferencewaspredicted
by group contrast-coded predictors, subjective stress (both lin-
ear and quadratic effects),and the interactions of these predictors
(Table 5). All effects are controlling for all other variables in the
regression model.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between stress controlla-
bility and the linear effect of subjective stress, F(1,17)=5.00,
p=0.028, R2 =0.061. This result indicates, again, that the rela-
tionshipsbetweensubjectivestressandStroopperformancevaried
by controllability of stress exposure. However, in this analysis, it
was the linear effect of stress that varied between groups. Follow-
up analyses were conducted to determine the nature of the linear
effects of subjective stress within groups. Within the CSt group,
there was a signiﬁcant linear effect of stress on Stroop interfer-
ence such that at higher levels of subjective stress, performance
became impaired, but at moderate levels of stress, performance
was improved F(1,27)=6.92, p=0.014, R2 =0.20. There were
no linear or quadratic relationships between subjective stress and
interference change within the USt group,F(1,23)=0.89,p=0.4,
or within the NSt group, F(1,27)=0.88,p=0.4 (Figure 3).
In the full regression described above, there were no quadratic
effects of subjective stress detected when controlling for group
Table 5 | Regression table for Experiment 2, model predicting change in Stroop interference (post-pre stress manipulation) by group status
(controllability: compares CSt versus USt groups; stress exposure: compares NSt group versus the average across CSt and USt groups);
subjective stress response (subjective stress: the linear effect of subjective stress; subjective stress2: the quadratic effect of subjective stress);
and interactions between these factors.
Source SS df MS FP R 2
Model 0.002a 8 0.000 1.092 0.378 0.102
(Constant) 0.003 1 0.003 16.933 0.000 0.180
Controllability 0.000 1 0.000 0.229 0.633 0.003
Stress exposure 0.000 1 0.000 0.160 0.691 0.002
Subjective stress 0.000 1 0.000 0.052 0.820 0.001
Subjective stress2 0.000 1 0.000 0.359 0.551 0.005
Controllability×subjective stress 0.001 1 0.001 4.991 0.028 0.061
Stress exposure×subjective stress 0.000 1 0.000 0.371 0.544 0.005
Controllability×subjective stress2 0.000 1 0.000 0.035 0.852 0.000
Stress exposure×subjective stress2 0.000 1 0.000 0.011 0.918 0.000
Error 0.014 77 0.000
Total 0.016 85 0.000
aR
2 =0.102 (adjusted R
2 =0.009).
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 2: Change in Stroop interference predicted by
stress reactivity and controllability. Change in Stroop interference (post-pre
stress manipulation) predicted by individual differences in subjective stress
and by group. (A) Quadratic relationship between subjective stress and
change in Stroop interference across all groups. (B) Linear relationship
between subjective stress and change in Stroop interference within the group
of participants with behavioral control over stressors. (C) Absence of a
signiﬁcant relationship between subjective stress and Stroop interference
changes for the group of people exposed to uncontrollable stress, or (D) to
no-stress.
and group interactions. This result could indicate that different
groups clustered on different parts of the quadratic curve, so that
equating participants on group status simply washed out the qua-
draticeffect.Inconsiderationofthispossibility,andtoexaminethe
effects of stress response on executive functioning across groups,
we conducted a regression predicting change in Stroop interfer-
ence by the linear and quadratic effects of subjective stress. Exam-
ined this way, there was a signiﬁcant quadratic effect such that
moderate levels of stress predicted reduced Stroop interference
while low or high levels of subjective stress predicted increased
Stroop interference, F(1,86)=4.27,p=0.042, R2 =0.047.
To determine whether there were group differences in Stroop
performance at baseline that could contribute to these effects, we
regressed baseline interference scores on group contrast codes.
This analysis conﬁrmed that participants randomly assigned to
each of the three stress conditions showed comparable Stroop
interference at baseline, F(2,87)=1.10,p=0.4.
We conducted analyses to investigate whether experimental
groups differed in Stroop accuracy. There were no differences in
baseline incongruent or neutral trial accuracy between groups
(p’s >0.2). In addition, there was no effect of stress exposure
on incongruent trial accuracy: the accuracy of subjects in the
no-stress group did not change over testing (M =0.03), and
their performance did not differ from subjects exposed to stress
(M =0.55), F(1,86)=0.53, p=0.5. However, there was a signiﬁ-
cant difference between controllability groups: subjects who were
exposed to controllable stress showed an improvement in accu-
racy on incongruent trials (M =1.13) while subject exposed to
uncontrollablestressshowednochangeinaccuracy(M =−0.04),
F(1,86)=4.33,p=0.04,R2 =0.05.Therewerenochangesinneu-
tral trial accuracy over the course of testing, and no differences in
neutral trial accuracy change between groups (p’s >0.6).
We conducted a full regression in which changes in incon-
gruent trial accuracy were predicted by group contrast codes, the
linear and quadratic effects of subjective stress, and interactions
between these variables. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant dif-
ference in accuracy change between the CSt and USt groups in
which having behavioral control predicted a greater improvement
in incongruent trial accuracy,F(1,80)=5.55,p=0.02,R2 =0.07.
Mood and affect
All groups showed comparable, and low (M =9.97), current lev-
els of depression as assessed by BDI-II scores, F(2,86)=0.90,
p=0.4. In addition, all groups showed similar negative affect at
baseline, F(2,86)=1.29, p=0.3. Although participants reported
similar levels of positive affect at baseline across groups,
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F(2,86)=2.24, p=0.12, a marginal difference emerged between
the CSt (M =27.10) and the USt (M =29.96) groups indicat-
ing that people randomly assigned to uncontrollable stress also
had higher positive affect at baseline, F(1,86)=2.98, p=0.09,
R2 =0.03. Including baseline positive affect in subsequent analy-
ses, however, failed to alter any results; therefore we report sim-
ple analyses only. Finally, there were no differences between
groups in change in negative, F(2,86)=1.66, p=0.2, or positive,
F(2,86)=0.18,p=0.8, affect over the course of testing.
DISCUSSION
These results support the view that non-contingency is an active
ingredient in the effects of uncontrollability on the relationship
between subjective stress and executive functioning. Once again,
stress response only predicted Stroop interference in the group
exposed to controllable (contingent) stressors.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Stress is ubiquitous, and previous research suggests it can have
both negative (Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et al., 2008, 2009) and
positive (Duncko et al., 2009; Weerda et al., 2010) effects on
cognitive function. However, from this previous research it was
not clear what determines whether stress enhances or impairs
function. The goal of the current studies was to investigate two
important factors that may moderate the effect of stress on
executive functioning: controllability of stress, and individual
differences in subjective response to stress. Our results suggest
that controllability and subjective response interact to determine
whether stress exposure will impair or enhance Stroop perfor-
mance: exposure to controllable stress that was experienced as
moderately intense predicted improved performance (reduced
interference), but subjective stress was unrelated to performance
when stress exposure was uncontrollable. In addition, people
exposed to controllable stress showed greater improvement in
accuracy on incongruent trials than people exposed to uncontrol-
lablestress,aresultthatfurthersupportsthebeneﬁtsof behavioral
control.
These results are consistent with previous research suggesting
the importance of controllability (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004;
Arnsten, 2009) and intensity (Lupien et al., 1999, 2007)i nm o d -
erating the effects of stress exposure on behavioral functioning.
Importantly, our ﬁndings extend this literature to examine how
these dimensions interact. In addition, this research uses experi-
mental manipulations of controllability together with assessment
of individual differences in subjective stress response to permit
detection of linear and quadratic effects of stress on EF. In Exper-
iment 1, there was a quadratic relationship between subjective
stress and Stroop performance across the full sample, and this
effectwasstrongestwithinthegroupexposedtocontrollablestress.
In Experiment 2, a similar quadratic relationship was detected
acrossthefullsample,butthegroupexposedtocontrollablestress
showed a linear effect of subjective stress on Stroop performance.
Because the dosage of controllable stress (proportion of trials that
were failure/long noise) was higher in Experiment 2, this linear
effect could reﬂect the fact that this group was shifted higher on
the U-shaped subjective stress curve than similar participants in
Experiment 1, and our analyses thus captured the upward slope
of this quadratic relationship. The average subjective response
to controllable stress in Experiment 1 was 0.50 standard devia-
tions above the response reported by the no-stress group, but in
Experiment2theresponsetocontrollablestresswas0.85standard
deviations above that reported by the no-stress group. Together,
these results support the hypothesis that exposure to moderate
and controllable stress causes improved functioning, while expo-
sureto(subjectively)moreintenseoruncontrollablestressimpairs
functioning.
In addition, these results demonstrate for the ﬁrst time that
controllability and subjective stress inﬂuence the effect of stress
on a measure of general EF (i.e., common EF; Friedman et al.,
2008), providing more precise evidence for the speciﬁc cognitive
systems affected by these factors. Previous research investigating
the effects of stress on cognitive functioning has largely focused
on declarative or working memory tasks, but prefrontal cortical
systems that are sensitive to stress and undergird aspects of work-
ing memory also support other types of EFs. For example, EFs
include the ability to hold goals in mind and resist interference
from distractors. To investigate the effects of stress on common
EF processes in this research, the color-word Stroop was used
because it has been shown to load strongly on a common EF fac-
tor (Friedman et al.,2008).We would expect that performance on
theStroopwouldimprovewithpractice(Logan,1988)andindeed
participants who were not exposed to stress showed improved
performance over testing. However, the predictive relationship
between subjective stress and Stroop performance emerged only
for subjects exposed to controllable stress. These results support
the hypothesis that controllability and subjective stress moderate
the effect of stress on core cognitive abilities that are recruited
not only for working memory tasks, but also for other tasks that
require EFs.
Comparing Experiments 1 and 2 leads to some tentative con-
clusions regarding the critical aspects of controllability that affect
behavioralfunctioning.Speciﬁcally,theseresultssuggestthatnon-
contingency between behavioral responses and stressors is sufﬁ-
cient to alter the relationship between subjective stress and Stroop
performance, as demonstrated by Experiment 2. These results
are consistent with the theory that exposure to non-contingency
causes disruption to basic learning systems (Oakes, 1982; Oakes
and Curtis, 1982).
The results of these experiments raise several questions. First,
the current study is limited by the absence of physiological mea-
sures of stress reactivity, which would enable us to compare
subjective and objective individual differences in stress responses.
Previous research has shown that subjective ratings are related to
physiological reactions, but are not perfectly correlated (Elzinga
and Roelofs, 2005; Alexander et al., 2007; Schoofs et al., 2009).
Our stress manipulation may have evoked responses in key stress
systems,e.g.,the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis and
sympathetic nervous system (SNS), but it is not possible to
determine the degree or timing of such responses without phys-
iological measures. Assessing multiple indices of physiological
stress response would provide insight on the correspondence
between subjective and objective reactivity to controllable or
uncontrollable stress exposure. In addition, such biological mea-
sures would help improve understanding of how controllable
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versus uncontrollable stress may affect the complex balance of
activation within and between stress systems, and interactions
between stress mediators (e.g., cortisol, catecholamines) as they
affect cognition. Previous work has suggested that the effect of
stress on cognitive functioning depends on the relative levels of
cortisol and adrenergic activity, which are related but not per-
fectly correlated (Okuda et al., 2004; Elzinga and Roelofs, 2005;
Roozendaal et al., 2006). Furthermore, one study suggested that
controllablestressleadstogreateradrenergicactivity,whileuncon-
trollable stress leads to greater cortisol response (Peters et al.,
1998). Exploring how controllability affects relative recruitment
of stress systems may provide insight on why controllability mod-
erates the relationship between subjective stress and cognitive
functioning.
Second, it remains an open question why subjective response
to stress was related to Stroop performance in the group exposed
to controllable stress, but not in the group exposed to uncon-
trollable stress. One possibility is that uncontrollable stress leads
to different neural responses than controllable stress, and thus
does not affect EF performance in the same way. In rodents,
the inability to learn to escape a stressor is related to decreased
activityinneuralsystemsresponsiblefordown-regulatingactivity
in stress-response regions; thus stress responses are permitted to
occur unchecked,ultimately leading to a sensitized arousal system
that reacts more readily to mild provocation (Maier and Watkins,
2005).Inhumans,similarregulatorybrainsystemsareinvolvedin
tuning down arousal and affect, and research on emotion regula-
tion strategies has demonstrated that these systems are recruited
in the service of purposeful regulation of emotion (Delgado et al.,
2008).Itmaybethatinhumans,thepresenceof contingencyasso-
ciationsalongwithmoderatelyintensivestressenablesrecruitment
of prefrontal brain systems that regulate arousal in a top-down
manner. This active and successful top-down regulation may
extend beyond regulation of arousal to a more general enhance-
ment of top-down control processes, and hence improved EF.
However, if an individual experiences those stressors as extreme,
top-down regulation may be unsuccessful and therefore yield no
beneﬁt.Meanwhile,theabsenceofcontingencyforpeopleexposed
to uncontrollable stress could remove this source of top-down
regulation, so that the biological stress response of these people
is more related to individual differences in bottom-up reactivity
and thus does not predict the ability to recruit top-down con-
trol in a subsequent EF task. However, note that this explanation
fails to explain the poorer Stroop performance on average across
the uncontrollable stress group in Experiment 1 (which, how-
ever, did not replicate in Experiment 2). Research incorporating
neurobiological methods in humans is thus needed to test this
theory.
Finally, in these experiments we detected no effects of mood
or affect. Because this research was conducted with a non-clinical
sample, and the majority of participants (71%) reported scores
below the cut-point for mild dysphoria (BDI>12; Kendall et al.,
1987; Beck et al., 1996), the absence of statistically signiﬁcant
depression effects may be unsurprising. The absence of stress
effects on affect may be due to the delay between exposure and
administration of the state-affect measure; any mood effects of
stress,orcontrollability,mayhavetaperedwhileparticipantscom-
pleted the Stroop task. Use of a self-report measure that queries
about emotions experienced during the stress manipulation may
provide a more sensitive assessment of affect (as in the subjective
ratings of stress, which were retrospective). Alternately, it may be
that the absence of group differences in affective change accu-
rately reﬂects the absence of controllability or exposure effects
on emotion in these experiments. As has been pointed out by
previous researchers (e.g., Lupien et al., 2007), stress and emo-
tion are not isomorphic; clarifying the relationships between
stress responses (both subjective and objective), controllability,
and emotion, remains an important target of clinical research.
Theresultsofthisresearcharerelevantforanyonewhowantsto
capitalizeonthepotentialofstresstoenhancegoal-directedbehav-
ior, while minimizing the negative effects of stress. In particular,
this research is relevant as we set physical or academic goals for
ourselves that are tuned to our individual appraisals of difﬁculty
andcontrollability.Futurestudiesinvestigatingcontrollabilityand
reactivity in settings such as education or clinical treatment may
provideinsightonhowstressexposurecanbeapowerfulsourceof
beneﬁt for students, clients, and others hoping to reap the helpful
effects of stress.
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